Games and Decision Making

by ;
Edition: 2nd
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2010-12-07
Publisher(s): Oxford University Press
List Price: $251.72

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Summary

The book blends together game theory and decision theory and presents the central topics of game theory in a clear and rigorous manner. Numerous applications from economics and other disciplines is used to illustrate the theory. The first chapter is an introduction to single person decision problems which is followed by the chapter on strategic form games (normal form games) with both complete and incomplete information. Among the applications of strategic form games are the Cournot model, the Bertrand model, the Hotelling model and the resource extraction game. This is followed by a chapter on single-person sequential decision problems. The book then moves on to the topic of sequential games (extensive form games) and the concept of sub-game perfect equilibrium. The chapters that follow these are on auctions and bargaining, including both axiomatic and non-cooperative theories of bargaining. There is then a full chapter on repeated games. The penultimate chapter is on sequential games with imperfect information and on equilibrium concepts like sequential equilibrium and Bayesian perfect equilibrium. The final chapter is a summary of the existence results of the various equilibrium concepts and provides detailed proofs of these results. All the chapters include several applications of the concepts discussed in the chapter.

Author Biography


The late Charalambos D. Aliprantis was distinguished Professor at the Krannert School of Management at Purdue University. During a career that spanned almost forty years, he published more than one hundred articles in the major journals in economic theory and mathematics and authored half a dozen books on economic theory and mathematics.

Subir K. Chakrabarti is Professor in the Department of Economics at Indiana University and Purdue University at Indianapolis. He has written more than twenty publications, with articles in journals such as Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, International Economic Review, and Journal of Public Economics.

Table of Contents

Preface
Choices
Functions
The optimization problem
First- and second-order conditions
Optimizing using the Lagrange method
Uncertainty and chance
Decision making under uncertainty
Decisions and Games
Two-person matrix games
Strategic games
Dominant and dominated strategies
Solving matrix games with mixed strategies
Examples of two-person games
Best responses and Nash equilibria
Games with incomplete information
Applications
Sequential Decisions
Graphs and trees
Single-person sequential decisions
Uncertainty and single-person decisions
Sequential Games
The structure of sequential games
Equilibria in sequential games
Applications of sequential games
Solving sequential games with behavior strategies
Auctions
Auctions with complete information
English auctions
Individual private-value auctions
Common-value auctions
Revenue equivalence
Bargaining
The Nash solution
Monotonicity in bargaining
The core of a bargaining game
An allocation rule: the Shapley value
Two-person sequential bargaining
Repeated Games
The structure and equilibria of repeated games
Subgame perfection in finite-horizon repeated games
Infinite-horizon repeated games
The Folk theorem and subgame perfect equilibrium
Applications of repeated and sequential games
Sequential Rationality
The market for lemons
Beliefs and strategies
Consistency of beliefs
Expected payoff
Sequential equilibrium
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Signaling games
Applications
Existence of Equilibria
Some Mathematical Preliminaries
Zero-sum games
Existence of equilibrium in strategic form games
Existence of equilibrium in sequential games
Existence of sequential equilibrium
Bibliography
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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